International Collaboration and Activities
Wake Forest University remains committed to academic freedom and to international collaboration while also complying with the changing landscape of federal regulations. Ultimately, these regulations help our research and scholarship to be free from undue influence.
NSPM-33 also requires that federal agencies strengthen protections for U.S. government-supported research and development against foreign interference, requiring disclosure of foreign talent recruitment programs. The U.S. government defines “Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs” as efforts that are organized, managed, or funded, by a foreign government, or a foreign government instrumentality or entity, to recruit science and technology professionals or students—regardless of citizenship or national origin, or whether having a full-time or part-time position.
WFU researchers should request a compliance check on any entity that they are considering for collaboration, and disclose their plans before signing any collaborative agreements with foreign institutions, even if they are not currently applying for federal funding.
Some foreign universities and companies have been seeking relationships with faculty at U.S. universities. These programs may provide appointments, labs, or startup funding at the foreign institution, or payment or research funding to be done at WFU or another institution.
The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 prohibits federal employees, contractors, and awardees—including institutions, individual investigators, and other key personnel —from participating in Malign Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs.
A Malign Foreign Talent Program, as defined by the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS & Science Act), is a program that is sponsored by:
- a foreign country of concern currently defined as:
- The People’s Republic of China
- the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
- The Russian Federation
- the Islamic Republic of Iran
- and any other country determined to be a country of concern by the Secretary of State
- an academic institution on the list developed under section 1286(c)(8) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019; OR
- a foreign talent recruitment program on the list developed under section 1286(c)(9) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.
AND a program, position, or activity that includes compensation that is directly provided by a foreign country at any level (national, provincial, or local) or their designee, or an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with a foreign country, whether or not directly sponsored by the foreign country, to the targeted individual, whether directly or indirectly stated in the arrangement, contract, or other documentation at issue.
Examples of compensation include cash or in-kind compensation such as:
- research funding
- promised future compensation
- complimentary foreign travel
- things of non-de minimis value (examples: honorific titles, career advancement opportunities or other types of remuneration or consideration)
In exchange for this compensation, an individual may be asked to:
- engage in the unauthorized transfer of intellectual property, materials, data products, or other nonpublic information;
- recruit trainees or researchers to enroll in such program, position, or activity;
- establish a laboratory, or company, accept a faculty position, or undertake any other employment or appointment in a foreign country in violation of terms and conditions of a federal research award;
- be unable to terminate the contract except in extraordinary circumstances;
- be limited in the capacity to carry out a research and development award or required to engage in work that would result in substantial overlap or duplication of a federal research and development award;
- be required to apply for and successfully receive funding from the sponsoring foreign government’s funding agencies with the sponsoring foreign organization as the recipient;
- be required to omit acknowledgment of the recipient institution with which the individual is affiliated, or the federal research agency sponsoring the research and development award, contrary to the institutional policies or standard terms and conditions of the federal research and development award;
- be required to not disclose to the federal research agency or employing institution the participation of such individual in such program, position, or activity; OR
- have a conflict of interest or conflict of commitment contrary to the standard terms and conditions of the federal research and development award;
Examples of malign foreign talent programs that pose a threat to national security interests in the United States include, but not limited to:
- Changjiang Scholar Distinguished Professorship
- Hundred Talents Plan
- Pearl River Talent Program
- Project 5-100
- River Talents Plan
- Thousand Talents Plan
- Any program that meets one of the criteria contained in Section 10638 (4)(A) and either Section 10638 (4)(B)(i) or (ii) in the CHIPS and Science Act.
If you have any questions about whether a program you are currently participating in, have participated in, or are considering participating in could be considered a Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program, reach out to the University’s Research Security Officer for consultation. You may also contact the Vice Provost for Research, your Dean, or OSRP to discuss the program.
As directed by NSPM-33, principal investigators (PIs), co-principal investigators (co-PIs), senior/key personnel, program directors (PDs), co-program directors (co-PDs), project managers, and anyone else identified in the request for proposals, notice of funding opportunity, or award terms and conditions must complete Foreign Travel Security Training if they travel internationally for organization business, teaching, conference attendance, or research purposes, regardless of whether the travel will be charged to a sponsored project.
In addition, all travel requests and reimbursements must be entered into XX, regardless of whether the trip is domestic or international. Export control receives information from the WFU Travel Office about employees’ international travel, and the Export Control Officer may contact travelers prior to their trip, depending on the destination and purpose. An export control license may be required before the travel occurs.
The export control and the Information Security Offices highly recommend taking a clean loaner laptop to foreign countries of concern that pose a high risk of data theft or breach of the WFU network upon return. While loaner laptops are highly recommended for all travel to foreign countries of concern, there are certain situations that the Export Control Officer may require that a traveler uses a loaner laptop for the duration of the travel.